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Japanese remained comforted by the
possibility that any new document
could be replaced or dramatically
amended after the “guests” left. The
irony of that hope, of course, is that
the Japanese constitution holds the
record – among constitutions current-
ly in-force – for the longest stretch of
time without a formal amendment.
What does the history of military
occupation tell us about the probabili-
ty that occupiers will remake host
constitutions? We have identified 107
instances of military occupation since
1789.4 We can compare these
episodes of occupation to our
chronology of constitutional revision
for the countries in question. If we call
“occupation constitutions” those docu-
ments that were written during and
immediately after occupation (within
two years), we observe twenty-six
occupations that resulted in forty-two
constitutions (some occupiers, like
the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, over-
saw multiple constitutions during their
stay).5 42 constitutions resulting from
26 of the 107 occupations is not a
paltry output by any means, especial-
ly if we consider that only 800 consti-
tutions or so have been produced
worldwide since 1789. However, it
does mean that a sizable majority of
occupations do not result in new con-
stitutions. Moreover, twelve of the 42
cases we identified as occupation
constitutions occurred in the two-year
window following occupation, and
thus may not necessarily have been
associated with the occupation after
all. Further research should certainly
delve into which kind of occupations
(and occupiers) tend to produce new
constitutions. Suffice it to say for now
that constitutional replacement is not
an automatic part of the script of
occupying states.
Do Occupiers Transplant Their
Own Institutions?









In February of 1946, General Douglas
MacArthur gave members of his staff
a week to produce a draft of a new
Japanese constitution. That draft
formed the core of a constitution that
has stood, formally unchanged, for 62
years and counting. The Japanese
case suggests that occupiers can
alter the institutional course of the
host country, perhaps for generations.
But we know very little about constitu-
tions written under such unusual cir-
cumstances. Given foreign control,
one might expect that occupation
constitutions are direct transplants,
perhaps lifted from the occupier’s own
constitution. After all, even in ordinary
times, drafters of constitutions borrow
foreign ideas (and sometimes whole
clauses, typographical errors and all)
from abroad.2 In this essay we report
some findings from an investigation of
the incidence, content, and durability
of constitutions written under foreign
military occupation. The focus on this
particular species of constitution is
part of a much larger project in which
we are identifying, collecting, and
analyzing written constitutions since
1789.3 Occupation constitutions rep-
resent a small minority (roughly 5%)
of constitutions since 1789, but know-
ing something about their structure
and fate is illuminating, particularly
with respect to states like current-day
Iraq and Afghanistan, whose institu-
tional future is widely discussed and
debated. The Japanese case, as we
shall see, is not at all typical of such
cases.
Do Occupations Typically Result in
Constitutional Replacement?
It seems obvious that occupiers
would oversee a revision of host con-
stitutions. Military occupations pre-
sumably arise from irreconcilable dif-
ferences between states, some of
which are likely to be political. But
even if political change is not among
the original motives for the conflict
and its resulting occupation, it is likely
to be part of the solution for occupiers
intent on setting their host state on a
new domestic and foreign policy
course. Constitutions are often com-
missioned to serve such highly sym-
bolic purposes. New documents sig-
nal a clean slate, allowing occupiers
to mark publicly the birth of a new
political order and to rally potentially
resistant citizens around it. Citizens of
the occupied state are often left with-
out much choice, even if attachment
to the old order is strong. In the
Japanese case, for example, most
elites after the war were reluctant to
let go of the Meiji constitution, let
alone replace it with a foreign trans-
plant. Indeed, their hopeful reading of
the rather vague Potsdam agreement
was that constitutional revision was
not necessary (Moore and Robinson
2002: 51). MacArthur squashed that
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sioned by the occupier (or, requested
by the newly empowered group of
hosts), it seems likely that the consti-
tution of the occupying state would
serve as a highly relevant model.
Presumably, the occupiers think high-
ly enough of their own institutions to
see them replicated elsewhere,
notwithstanding the need for adapting
them to their new context. Some imi-
tation of the occupier’s charter seems
probable even if design is left to
domestic actors, who are likely to be
handpicked by the occupiers or at
least interested in appeasing them.
Aside from any ideological or instru-
mental inclination for transplantation
on the part of the hosts, it is quite
possible that informational constraints
propel them in this direction (Weyland
2005). World powers, understandably,
are well represented among the his-
torical list of occupiers and the consti-
tutions of such powers are likely to be
among the most prominent and avail-
able models for off-the-shelf adoption.
Of course, the exalted stature of
these powers might render their con-
stitutions less attractive, as smaller,
perhaps fledgling states might view
the models of world powers as inap-
propriate or irrelevant to their own
needs. Indeed, such a pattern is evi-
dent in the case with the United
States, whose constitution was widely
copied (especially in Latin America) in
the 1800s, but which has become
less and less influential since then.
Our data allow us to test the possibili-
ty of occupational inheritance in
rather comprehensive fashion. Our
approach is to estimate the similarity
between each constitution in the year
of its adoption and all the contempo-
rary and historical constitutions that
may have served as models, includ-
ing previous constitutions from the
host country. Thus, for example, the
Japanese constitution of 1946 can be
compared with all 74 constitutions
then in force, as well as the 346 con-
stitutions that had been adopted in
the world since 1789. Among such
dyads we should expect occupation
dyads (the host constitution and that
of the occupier) to have a higher simi-
larity score than that of the average
constitutional dyad, ideally controlling
for a set of other factors that would
predict similarity.6
Our dataset records over 600 charac-
teristics of constitutions, thus making
it possible to calculate constitutional
similarity along numerous dimen-
sions. We start simply (or at least
broadly), by calculating similarity
based on the “inventory” of each con-
stitution. We identify 112 topics that
have historically been included in
constitutions (ranging from such mod-
ern topics as the regulation of
telecommunications, to seemingly
trivial aspects like the motto for the
state, to central institutional topics like
the selection process for the execu-
tive). For each constitutional dyad, we
then calculate the percentage of the
112 topics that both constitutions
either include or exclude. This meas-
ure, then, captures the degree to
which any two constitutions address
the same topics, and not whether
they make the same choices under
those topics, although the two meas-
ures will likely be highly correlated. To
illustrate, consider some non-occupa-
tion examples. The French constitu-
tion of 1791 and that of the United
States adopted two years earlier
mutually address or ignore 72 percent
of the 112 topics, leaving 28 percent
of topics for which one is silent and
the other expressive. Fast forward
167 years – through a period pocked
with periodic constitutional revision in
France –and we observe that the
French constitution of 1958 shares
only 58 percent of the same topics as
doeswith the little-changed United
States constitution. Across all non-
occupation dyads in the data, the
average similarity score is 0.70 (70 %
agreement) and ranges from 0.41
(Mozambique 2004 and Liberia 1825)
to 0.97 (Bolivia 1948 and Venezuela
1857).7 (The years mark the date of
promulgation of the state’s constitu-
tion and are also the time points at
which the constitutions are com-
pared).
The similarity scores for the constitu-
tional dyads exhibit a modest conver-
gence effect, albeit with a fair amount
of dispersion, when compared with
the larger sample. Across 29 of the
42 occupational dyads for which we
have data, the average similarity
score is 0.75, ranging from 0.58
(Afghanistan (2004) and its occupier
the United States (1789)) to 0.88
(Albania (1939) and its occupier Italy
(1848)).8 Other occupation dyads with
high similarity scores include Poland
(1952) and its occupier the Soviet
Union (1936) at 0.82, Laos (1991)
and its occupier Vietnam (1980) at
0.79, and Lithuania (1938) and its
occupier Germany (1919) at 0.79.
Most of the similarity scores for the
eight cases in the data (of a total of
fourteen) in which the United States
played the role of occupier are con-
siderably lower than the non-occupa-
tion average of 0.70. The exceptions
are Japan 1946 (0.73), Germany
1919, (0.74), and the Dominican
Republic 1924 (0.76). Sadly, we do
not yet have data on the 1918 consti-
tution of Haiti, which a young Franklin
Delano Roosevelt allegedly claimed
to have written while serving as
Assistant Secretary of the Navy dur-
ing the US occupation.9 Turning
towards another superpower and fre-
quent occupier, we see that the
record of the Soviet Union is also not
one of constitution imposition. Except
for Poland 1952 (0.82) and its prede-
cessor, Poland 1947 (0.75), the con-
stitutions of Soviet-occupied states
are not especially similar to that of
their occupier. A good, or at least
intriguing, comparison is Afghanistan.
While the United States-Afghanistan
(2004) dyad marks the extreme with
respect to dissimilarity (0.58), the
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that occupiers neither impose their
own institutions nor disturb terribly the
institutional trajectory of the occupied
state. Nonetheless, it is evident that
the average effects obscure some
interesting variation in both of these
senses – variation that merits further
scrutiny. Moreover, occupations may
have more targeted, but consequen-
tial, effects on the occupied state’s
constitution. We speculate about
some such effects in our discussion
below.
How Long Do Occupation
Constitutions Last?
Who would have thought that a
Japanese constitution promulgated at
gunpoint and, in part, crafted by a
group of American military officers in
1946 would still be in effect (not to
mention formally unchanged) in
2008? After all, the life expectancy of
constitutions – regardless of how they
are produced – is roughly seventeen
years.12 For any number of reasons,
one would expect transplanted institu-
tions to be more vulnerable. This
would seem to be especially so for
constitutions, wrapped up as they are
with national identity. Surely, the
Japanese case must be exceptional
in its longevity.
Indeed, it is. At thirteen years, the
expected lifespan of occupation con-
stitutions is shorter than that of other
constitutions. Moreover, this life
expectancy may even be an overesti-
mate as it includes the years that
constitutions were in effect under the
protection of the occupier. The “natur-
al” life expectancy (that is, excluding
the years under formal occupation) of
occupation constitutions is only 5
years. In this sense, one might sus-
pect that the security umbrella that
the US has extended over Japan over
the years has indirectly preserved its
constitution. Of course, it may also be
that the drafters of the 1946 docu-
ment stumbled upon a remarkably
Soviet-Afghanistan (1987) dyad also
exhibits below-average similarity
(0.67).
Thus, on average, the constitutions of
occupied states seem to inherit little
from their occupier.10 This surprises
us. Equally surprising is the degree of
continuity between the occupied
state’s previous constitution and the
occupation product. Generally, consti-
tutional revisions compare with their
predecessor by a score of 0.81. With
occupation constitutions, this score
averages only a tad below this at 0.80
and ranges from 0.62 (Hungary 1949
and 1946) to 0.97 (Dominican
Republic 1924 and 1908) across
twenty-two occupation constitutions.
The Japanese case is telling. While
MacArthur’s staff undoubtedly had a
heavy hand in crafting the Japanese
charter, their product bears striking
similarity to the Meiji constitution of
1889 (0.81). Indeed, of the 62 consti-
tutions in force at the time of drafting
for which we have data (out of a uni-
verse of 74), the Meiji constitution is
the eighth most similar. This is a star-
tling reminder that, while externally
imposed, the Japanese constitution of
1946 bears a distinctively domestic
stamp.11 And, as the distribution of
scores suggests, the Japanese case
is not unique. To return to the Afghan
cases of 1987 and 2004, both consti-
tutions – supervised by the Soviet
Union and the United States, respec-
tively – were quite similar to their
home-grown predecessor (0.82 and
0.80, respectively).
stable balance between domestic
interests in Japan. Whatever the
case, the document’s durability is fair-
ly exceptional. Several other post-
WWII constitutions have also proved
comparatively resilient (e.g., Austria
and Italy) as well as several constitu-
tions resulting from situations of occu-
pation in Latin America in the 19th
century (Mexico’s constitution of 1867
and Paraguay’s of 1870). However,
these cases are – like the Japanese
1946 document – atypical.
Taken together, these results suggest
“[...] on average, the consti-
tutions of occupied states
seem to inherit little from
their occupier.”
Conclusion and Discussion
An exploration of the incidence, con-
tent, and stability of occupation consti-
tutions suggests that the occupier’s
effect on their host’s core institutions
is fairly modest. To summarize: (1)
only one quarter of occupations actu-
ally result in new constitutions; (2)
those constitutions that are produced
are, as we might expect, short lived;
(3) contrary to our expectations, occu-
pation constitutions bear only a slight-
ly resemblance to the constitution of
the occupying country and more
closely a far greater resemblance to
their own prior laws. Nonetheless, it is
“[...] the expected lifespan of
occupation constitutions is
shorter than that of other
constitutions. Moreover, this
life expectancy may even be
an overestimate as it
includes the years that con-
stitutions were in effect
under the protection of the
occupier.”
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the more coercive context we
describe here.
3 The Comparative Constitutions
Project. For details, see the project
website at comparativeconstitution-
sproject.org.
4 We limit ourselves to cases of for-
eign military occupation in which a
sovereign state is occupied by one or
more other states, thus excluding
cases of colonialism and occupation
by multilateral forces.
5 We include here only “replace-
ments,” and not amendments, of con-
stitutions. This is sometimes a blurred
distinction. We reserve the term
amendment for those changes in
which drafters follow the amendment
process of the old constitution and
call replacements those changes in
which they work from scratch. In
practice, we do not always know the
details of the adoption process and,
in such cases, we go by what histori-
ans and constitutional scholars identi-
fy as a new, or replaced, constitution.
6 For cases in which multiple states
occupied another, we select only that
dyad that includes the primary occupi-
er.
7 Not counting comparisons of consti-
tutions within states, whose similarity
can reach 0.99 in places.
8 Again, years represent the date of
the constitution’s promulgation.
9 Hans Schmidt (1995: 111) suggests
that there is little basis for FDR’s
claim (allegedly made during his first
presidential campaign) and credits the
Office of the Solicitor in the State
Department for most of the drafting.
10 But even this small effect may be
spurious since the occupier’s consti-
tution might be more influential for
reasons other than its political domin-
ion over the guest. A more relevant
comparison is one between occupa-
tion dyads and those dyads that com-
pare the same occupiers’ constitu-
tions with those of non-occupied
states. However, the average similari-
ty score for these latter dyads (0.70)
is no different from the overall mean,
thus corroborating the previous esti-
mate of the average occupation
effect.
11 This finding accords with the fili-
greed account of Moore and
Robinson (2002), who emphasize the
cooperative role of Japanese actors
in constitutional re-design.
12 Baseline survival estimate from a
model of the 821 constitutions written
since 1789. See Elkins, Ginsburg,
Melton (forthcoming) for more details.
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possible that this analysis misses
more subtle, but still consequential,
effects of occupation. In particular, it
could be that the occupier’s alter-
ations are more targeted, leaving
alone the basic structure of gover-
nance but tweaking a particularly criti-
cal provision. We see this to some
extent in each of the cases that we
have examined in any detail. In the
Japanese case, for example, the
“peace clause” (Article 9) represents
a key United States demand for mili-
tary demobilization. In other cases,
we see that occupiers have implanted
provisions in constitutions that guar-
antee the occupier’s material interest
in trade or investment. The provisions
for treaty approval in the Iraqi consti-
tution, which are conducive to oil
agreements with the United States,
are critical in this sense. Similarly,
FDR’s 1918 Haitian constitution
eased land holding rights for foreign-
ers, an opening that would allow
American investors to acquire lands
for highly anticipated agriculture ven-
tures (Schmidt 1995: 111). Perhaps,
these more targeted impositions
make sense from an occupier’s
strategic perspective. Given the long
odds of transplants’ surviving, insist-
ing on a limited number of crucial
principles or provisions might very
well maximize their impact. In his
instructions to his staff, General
MacArthur had scribbled three
requirements for the new Japanese
constitution in a short memo, among
them military demobilization.
Certainly, the product of that limited
approach has endured.
Notes
1 We thank the editors, Michael
Coppedge and Anthony Messina, for
their helpful comments.
2 Elkins is completing a manuscript
that describes the global spread of
constitutional ideas under more vol-
untary circumstances in addition to
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